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1. Introduction
Economics is a social science. As much as understanding individual decision mak-
ing is crucial for its development, it is first 
through social interactions that markets and 
institutions appear. The economic world is 
a product of the social world, and the social 
world is a product of the human capability 
to interact in ever-larger groups, from the 
small hunter–gatherer tribes of the stone 
age to our heavily interconnected planetary 
society. Conversely, the feats an individual is 
capable of are enormously augmented by the 
existence of the social world, as less and less 
effort is required to satisfy basic needs and 
more time and resources are freed to pursue 
higher goals. It should come as no surprise 
that the human brain is uniquely adapted to 
the social world. While the dependence of 
human society on the capabilities and charac-
teristics of the human brain is little more than 
a tautology, the recent decades have brought 
the recognition that the relation is bidirec-
tional, that is, the converse link is equally 
strong, and the human brain’s  normal func-
tioning is heavily dependent on the social 
world, to the extent that disturbances in the 
latter lead to disturbances in the former.
We are hopefully past the point where 
an argument is necessary as to whether 
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 economics should pay attention to the 
human brain. A human being is his or her 
brain. From toes to nose, everything else is 
a convenient accessory. It is, hence, clear 
that economics studies human brains, since 
it studies human decision makers and their 
behavior. Arguing whether economics 
should pay attention to neuroscientific stud-
ies is as fruitful as arguing whether economic 
theory should pay attention to mathemat-
ics. The question is not whether it should 
(the answer is of course yes, in both cases), 
but how and to what extent. The exact role 
played by potassium ions in brain processes 
is probably not very consequential for eco-
nomic studies, exactly as the elegance of a 
correct mathematical proof has little bearing 
on the economic significance of the result. In 
both cases, that is hardly the point.
The bidirectionality of the link between 
brain and social world renders the recogni-
tion that economics should pay attention to 
neuroscience even more obvious. At the same 
time, it points out that the converse is equally 
true, and neuroscience should pay attention 
to the social sciences, including economics. 
This might sound surprising at first, because 
economists typically and implicitly think of 
their discipline as dealing with high-order 
constructs, while some other disciplines con-
centrate on more clearly delimited objects. 
One could naïvely think that neuroscience 
is exactly one such example. The argument 
would be that, after all, the only thing needed 
to understand the functioning of the brain 
is, well, the brain. This reductionistic argu-
ment, however, is fallacious, and amounts to 
attempting to develop a theory of planes by 
looking at what they are made of, ignoring 
their interaction with human society, starting 
with the fact that planes fly and ending with 
the fact that most planes fly to bring people to 
places they want to be, typically in exchange 
for money. The human brain evolved over 
time, and in doing so, certain characteristics 
were selected for. It is becoming increasingly 
clear that the brain and the first versions of 
the human social world coevolved over time. 
Understanding which characteristics this 
coevolution selected for and why they pro-
vided an evolutionary advantage provides a 
far better understanding of the nature and 
functioning of the brain than statistical stud-
ies on the relative proportion of neurons 
and glial cells in each brain region. This has 
been recognized in neuroscience (see, e.g., 
Krakauer et al. 2017), and is the starting 
point of the recent book of Schutt, Seidman, 
and Keshavan (2015), which this review essay 
will focus on. The following quote drives the 
point home.
[...] as research on the brain accelerated, it 
became increasingly clear that internal exam-
ination alone was insufficient for understand-
ing the development and functioning of [the 
brain].
Schutt, Seidman, and 
Keshavan (2015, p. 2)
Social Neuroscience is the name of a 
nascent discipline that started with this reali-
zation. The term was coined by Cacioppo and 
Berntson (1992), who viewed it as the conflu-
ence of social psychology and neuroscience. 
Those authors defended an approach based 
on “multilevel integrative analysis” for the 
study of both brain and behavior, meaning a 
bidirectional exchange between the different 
levels of analysis that arise from the different 
structural scales targeted by different disci-
plines, that is, the biological (microscopic) 
substrate studied by neuroscience and the 
social (macroscopic) level proper of psychol-
ogy or economics. The objective of the pres-
ent work is to present a selective overview 
of developments and trends in this field. 
As a review essay, the scope will be roughly 
defined by the topics covered in the book by 
Schutt, Seidman, and Keshavan (2015), aptly 
titled Social Neuroscience: Brain, Mind, and 
Society.However, economics is notably absent 
from that text, and since the intention of the 
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overview is to pay special attention to the 
relevance of recent research in social neuro-
science for economics and economists, I will 
take detours outside the scope of the book as 
needed in order to give the proper context.
To understand the internal dynamics of 
the social neuroscience field, and to put the 
remainder of the article in perspective, the 
reader might find it useful to keep in mind 
two key realizations and two practical obser-
vations. The two key realizations, already 
hinted at above, are, first, the bidirectionality 
between brain and social world, and second, 
their likely coevolution. The first explains the 
increasing interdisciplinarity of the field, as 
social scientists and neuroscientists realize 
that their respective disciplines are insuf-
ficient to foster progress beyond a certain 
point. The second helps us move beyond the 
merely descriptive and understand the ori-
gins and functioning of social and neurologi-
cal processes. The first practical observation 
is that, to date, much research in this field has 
been driven by mental illnesses, exactly in 
the same way that much of the early progress 
in neuroscience occurred as a consequence 
of the study of brain lesions (see, e.g., chap-
ter 2 of Cacioppo, Visser, and Pickett 2006). 
Many mental illnesses, and in particular 
schizophrenia, involve a breakdown of the 
“social brain,” which is the object of study of 
social neuroscience. For this reason, men-
tal illnesses, in addition to being a socially 
important problem worthy of study, are an 
invaluable source of data for the field. This 
is not to say that current social neuroscience 
focuses exclusively on such illnesses. To the 
contrary, in the last fifteen years, research in 
social neuroscience has increasingly focused 
on the social behavior of mentally healthy 
decision makers, allowing for the scope of 
research to encompass such social phenom-
ena as, for instance, stereotyping, social 
exclusion, and social interactions, to mention 
just a few. The second practical observation, 
maybe linked to the first, is that economics is 
currently underrepresented in the field and 
(in the author’s opinion) currently risks being 
left out.
The structure of the article is as follows. 
Section 2 briefly reviews some recent devel-
opments and trends within neuroscience 
that are necessary to understand both the 
goals of social neuroscience and the chal-
lenges faced by neuroeconomics. Section 3 
provides a short historical perspective on the 
development of the field. Section 4 discusses 
the main insights of social neuroscience with 
respect to the nature, functions, and evolu-
tion of the social brain. Section 5 discusses 
the failures of the social brain that fuel and 
motivate large parts of the field, ranging from 
schizophrenia to data on orphanage-raised 
individuals. Section 6 offers a partial and 
probably biased discussion on what social 
neuroscience and economics can learn from 
each other. Along the way, the article will 
refer the reader to specific contributions 
(chapters) in Schutt, Seidman, and Keshavan 
(2015), some earlier texts such as Cacioppo, 
Visser, and Pickett (2006), and specific arti-
cles that go beyond those texts.
2. Some Developments and Trends in 
Neuroscience
Over a decade ago, Camerer, Loewenstein, 
and Prelec (2005) provided a review of 
developments in neuroscience and how they 
might inform economics. Although a large 
part of the early efforts were focused on indi-
vidual decision making, it has to be remarked 
that, since the very beginning, a certain 
number of neuroeconomic studies consid-
ered paradigms centered on explicitly social 
situations (see, e.g., the review of Fehr and 
Camerer 2007 on social preferences). The 
discipline has experienced significant growth 
since then, as illustrated in the more recent 
review of Fehr and Rangel (2011) on the 
neural basis of economic choice. Likewise, 
neuroscience has started paying increasing 
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attention to economic decision making. It 
is, of course, impossible to review the many 
developments within this field here. A hand-
ful of those, however, are important both to 
understand the current trends in social neu-
roscience and to clarify possible misunder-
standings among economists.
2.1 Brain Localization versus Network 
Connectivity
One frequent misunderstanding arising 
from early neuroeconomic studies is related 
to the reverse inference fallacy. Suppose dif-
ferential activity in a given brain region is 
detected during a mental process X. Knowing 
from the literature that this particular brain 
region is also involved in processes of type Y, 
the fallacy leads the researcher to conclude 
that process X must be of type Y, which is 
clearly not justified. To be clear, careful 
reverse inference can be valuable, since it 
can be used, e.g., to arbitrate between com-
peting hypotheses and find out which ones 
are compatible with the data. The brain, 
however, is a highly complex organ in whose 
structure no particular efficiency-based 
planning can be discerned. Practically each 
and every brain substructure is involved in a 
large number of different functions, the con-
nections between them being often less than 
clear. It is of course tempting to draw a brain 
map and neatly label brain regions with pur-
ported functions in a one-to-one way. Such 
enticingly simple maps, however, must be 
seen as extreme simplifications, at best.
Indeed, the first important development 
to take into account is that neuroscience is 
steadily moving away from narrow localiza-
tion ideas (and has been doing so for some 
time). Such ideas can be traced back to the 
concept of “brain modularity,” which rests 
on the assumptions of domain specificity and 
fixed neural localization for many aspects of 
cognition (Fodor 1983). Such assumptions, 
however, have been repeatedly challenged in 
recent years. Certain brain functions (say, 
controlling breathing or heart activity) can 
clearly be traced back to specific brain 
regions, but higher-order activities such as 
decision making, reward processing, or social 
evaluations are not associated with a single, 
well-delimited brain region that research-
ers can then target as a region of interest. 
Although there is evidence of modularity 
to a certain extent, such functions typically 
involve interactions among a number of 
brain regions, each of which, in turn, is also 
involved in a large number of other functions. 
There is a clear shift in neuroscience, away 
from the study of brain structures in isolation 
and towards the study of interconnected net-
works of brain structures associated with cer-
tain broad kinds of functions. This requires, 
of course, a certain knowledge of anatomical 
connectivity, that is, of the neural pathways 
actually connecting distant brain regions. 
But the key concept is functional connec-
tivity, which can be roughly defined as the 
temporal correlation of activity in different 
brain regions during a given (class of) tasks, 
and can be studied, e.g., by either correlat-
ing activity with a fixed region of interest or 
using model-free techniques as independent 
component analysis. The  take-home message 
is that, as we study higher social cognitive 
functions, we might discover that there is lit-
tle to learn from whether specific, localized 
regions of the brain are active or not. Such 
brain regions might be more constructively 
considered nodes in a series of interrelated 
networks, with the same region possibly play-
ing different roles in different networks.1
1 Some researchers go even further in their rejection of 
modular ideas and propose to focus on domain-general, 
highly distributed networks. For instance, in the field of 
memory, Fuster (2009) proposed a distributed-network 
paradigm where “nodes” would capture a far smaller scale 
than the brain regions usually discussed in neuroeconom-
ics (see also Fuster and Bressler 2012). Following simi-
lar arguments, Lindquist and Barrett (2012) argue that 
human emotions such as, e.g., anger or disgust, are mental 
states resulting from the interaction of broadly  distributed 
 functional networks. In addition, there is increasing evi-
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A basic example is the default mode 
network (DMN), associated with inter-
nal mentation and the brain’s resting state, 
which includes the medial prefrontal cor-
tex (MPFC), the posterior cingulate cortex 
(PCC), parts of the posterior temporal cortex 
around the temporoparietal junction (TPJ), 
and areas along the lateral temporal cortex 
(Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, and Schacter 
2008). As we will see below, there might be 
just such a network corresponding to the 
“social brain,” which, somewhat surprisingly, 
overlaps with the DMN. And of course, 
there has been much discussion in neuroeco-
nomics about the reward valuation network 
(RVN). As a case in point, it is illustrative to 
have a brief look at this better-known case, 
which will also prove to be relevant when 
we turn to the discussion of the social brain 
(figure 1 provides a qualitative depiction 
of brain regions and networks mentioned 
in the text, as well as a reference for their 
 often-abbreviated names).
Early brain-imaging studies showed a large 
variety of brain regions related to economic 
decision making. The picture was later clar-
ified by a series of discoveries related to the 
neurotransmitter dopamine and the neural 
pathways dependent on it. Adopting a sim-
plified view, the midbrain dopamine system 
encodes the difference between expected 
and realized rewards (the “reward prediction 
error”), which in turn is used as an input to 
construct a “value” (see Schultz 1998, 2010) 
that underlies decision making. The RVN is 
essentially the network which encodes that 
value, which is tempting to compare to neo-
classical utility. Its key components are ana-
tomically connected to the  dopaminergic 
neurons and receive their input: the striatum 
dence that the more complex a function is, the more idio-
syncratic its localization in the brain is. While there might 
be starting regions for basic functions, common to all indi-
viduals, higher-order complex processes might be orga-
nized differently in each individual brain (see Fehr 2013; 
Fehr and Herrmann 2015). 
(a deep brain structure, part of the basal gan-
glia, which includes the nucleus accumbens) 
and the medial prefrontal cortex (especially 
the ventromedial part). It is likely that the 
network also includes other frontal brain 
areas, especially the frontopolar and orbitof-
rontal cortices ( Padoa-Schioppa and Assad 
2006). Many studies have included several 
other regions in this network, but recent 
work has suggested that the actual RVN 
should be distinguished from other, related 
ones. In particular, it might make sense to 
speak of a cognitive (self-)control network, 
including the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC) and the anterior cingulate cortex 
(ACC) (Gläscher et al. 2012). This is espe-
cially interesting because these two areas are 
evolutionarily quite different: the DLPFC 
is a neocortex area, which has been con-
sistently associated with higher cognitive 
functions, including executive control and 
working memory; the ACC is an older, limbic 
area, which performs more basic functions 
as the detection of an elementary conflict 
between competing impulses. Also, other 
studies have revealed that the process of 
choice implementation in the brain might be 
better understood as functionally separate 
from the encoding of valuation, and there 
might exist a specific network for this pur-
pose (labeled as the choice implementation 
network in figure 1), including the posterior 
parietal cortex and the nearby intraparietal 
sulcus. There is a certain (evolutionary) logic 
to this, as the main functions of the intrapari-
etal sulcus are related to visual attention and 
eye–hand coordination (Kable and Glimcher 
2009), both necessary for the execution of 
simple choices.
In view of the evidence accumulated in the 
recent decades, a highly simplified picture of 
decision making in the brain might be as fol-
lows. First, the dopaminergic system (includ-
ing the striatum) keeps track of the reward 
prediction error and the medial  prefrontal 
area of the brain (the ventromedial prefrontal 
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cortex and possibly the orbitofrontal cortex, 
which are anatomically adjacent or overlap-
ping, depending on naming conventions) 
then builds “decision values,” in part through 
a reinforcement process on the basis of the 
dopaminergic feedback (but also relying on 
other sources, e.g., explicit labels or infor-
mation from working or episodic memory). 
This reinforcement process is most likely the 
function of the RVN and might integrate dif-
ferent inputs into a single value. Second, the 
anterior cingulate cortex (which is anatomi-
cally just behind the medial prefrontal cor-
tex) fulfills such crucial functions as action 
monitoring and error and conflict detection. 
At the same time, left and right of the medial 
prefrontal area, the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex provides the link to working memory 
and executive control. These two areas might 
form the core of a cognitive control network. 
Third, regions located in the parietal areas 
that originally governed visual attention and 
hand movements might form a choice imple-
mentation network executing and monitor-
ing actual choices. Fourth, a number of deep 
brain regions naturally contribute to the 
process, ranging from the amygdala (which 
associates stimuli to motivational salience) to 
the hippocampus (which provides the link to 
episodic memory).
In summary, there is no specific region 
for decision making, not even for a well-de-
fined component thereof. At the same time, 
not all regions identified in all decision-mak-
Figure 1
Notes: Qualitative representation of selected brain regions in the networks mentioned in the text, plus some 
additional, important structures. The left-hand and right-hand pictures present the lateral and medial views 
of the brain, respectively. The symbols are meant to represent an approximate orientation and not a precise 
area. Thanks are due to Alexander Jaudas for this figure.
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ing studies are part of the same network. 
Rather, there are functionally different but 
highly interconnected networks fulfilling 
different functions that contribute to deci-
sion making. It is likely that the same is true 
for virtually any higher-order brain function 
that economics might set its sights on. The 
 take-home message at this point is that any 
future neuroeconomics study built on the 
premise that X regions do this and Y regions 
do that will be at least partly misleading.
2.2 Epigenetics and Neuroplasticity
The second important development is a 
further shift, this time away from the con-
ception of the adult brain as a static struc-
ture and towards a more dynamic vision. 
Advances in genetics and neuroscience have 
made clear that, when studying brain pro-
cesses and human behavior, drawing a clear 
separation between biological and social 
factors is not justified, and this realization 
underlies several of the chapters in Schutt, 
Seidman, and Keshavan (2015). On the one 
hand, genetics has shown that whether genes 
become active or not depends on environ-
mental factors, with the consequence that 
identical genetic endowments might result 
in different phenotypical expressions. In 
particular, the link from the biological to the 
social is far from being a straightforward one. 
On the other hand, neurology has discov-
ered that the brain can significantly change 
in response to experiences, including those 
arising from social interaction, providing a 
feedback link from the social to the biolog-
ical. Further, neuroimaging studies are mak-
ing increasingly clear that there is no physical 
separation of brain regions regulating social 
and “rational” processing. We will now turn 
to these developments.
The recent advances in research in genet-
ics are particularly relevant for the  long-run 
research agenda in microeconomics. In the 
search for the ultimate determinants of 
behavior, microeconomists turned to formal 
assumptions (derived from normative con-
siderations or introspection) first, and to psy-
chological foundations second. The advent 
of neuroeconomics can be understood as the 
third step, in which a neurobiological basis 
of behavioral processes is sought. It is easy 
to jump ahead and predict that the fourth 
step should be “genoeconomics,” for our 
genes carry a complete blueprint of what we 
are to become, and hence of how we are to 
behave. Alas, this argument, seldom explic-
itly stated but often implicitly lurking in the 
background nowadays, is flawed. It is sim-
ply not true that our genetic blueprint fully 
determines who we are. The old “nature 
vs. nurture” argument has by now taken a 
huge step forward with the discovery of epi-
genetics. In a nutshell, genes determine who 
we are and what we do (the “phenotype”) 
through the production of specific proteins. 
However, the physical and social environ-
ment to which we are exposed influences 
whether specific genes become activated or 
not. Insights from molecular biology have 
illuminated the mechanisms that modify 
gene function without altering the DNA 
itself. Certain molecules called microRNAs 
can act on the molecules that translate the 
information of the genes into protein pro-
duction, effectively silencing the genes. 
More generally, we now know that one of the 
biochemical mechanisms altering how the 
instructions encoded in the DNA are trans-
lated is the addition of a methyl group to a 
DNA nucleotide, called DNA methylation. 
Methylation can be measured, delivering an 
indicator of the extents of modifications that 
the translation of a person’s genetic blueprint 
has suffered. Crucially, it turns out that social 
experiences across the lifespan can activate 
all these processes and turn certain genes 
off or on. In other words, our social inter-
actions, especially in early childhood, can 
very well influence whether a certain part 
of our genetic heritage determines our later 
behavior or becomes a dormant, irrelevant 
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marker in the background. For instance, it 
has been shown that orphans raised in state 
institutions present higher levels of DNA 
methylation than children raised by families 
(Naumova et al. 2012; see also section 5.2).
If epigenetics shows that the mapping 
from genes to behavior is less deterministic 
than originally assumed, the discovery of 
neuroplasticity delivers a similar caveat for 
the mapping between specific brain areas 
and modes of behavior (chapter 2 of Schutt, 
Seidman, and Keshavan 2015, written by 
Matcheri S. Keshavan, provides a short 
overview). Even ignoring the complications 
of epigenetics, it has been shown that expe-
rience (both in childhood and adulthood) 
directly changes the brain. Specifically, the 
brain responds to physical and social stim-
uli by growing new connections and letting 
others decay. Of course, the brain changes 
in response to early childhood experiences, 
which is hardly surprising, as it is still not 
completely developed at that stage. More 
important for economics, however, is the 
fact that neuroplasticity is not limited to such 
early phases. Experience-dependent neuro-
plasticity occurs throughout development, 
and is particularly important for activities 
related to reward and learning. Even beyond 
biological maturation, the brain is far from 
immutable. Daily activities and the input 
from our social environment can lead to 
long-lasting changes in brain  structure. This 
has been known for a long time for more 
purely biological domains, as, e.g., Nobel 
Prize-winning studies on the development 
of the visual cortex (Wiesel 1982). A more 
recent example of activity-induced changes 
in brain structure established that adult 
London taxi drivers experienced posterior 
hippocampus growth as a consequence of 
the extensive memory training required by 
their job, in comparison to both age-matched 
controls (Maguire et al. 2000) and London 
bus drivers (Maguire, Woollett, and Spiers 
2006) (a far better  control group).2 This is an 
example of neurogenesis, the growing of new 
brain tissue, a possibility which is well-doc-
umented only for the hippocampus and a 
region known as the olfactory bulb, related 
to the sense of smell (Ernst and Frisen 
2015). Most examples of neuroplasticity cor-
respond to neuronal reorganization and spe-
cialization, where, for instance, the functions 
of damaged brain regions are taken over by 
nearby regions.
While neuroplasticity typically has pos-
itive connotations, the brain is of course 
also susceptible to physical alterations and 
impairments even in the absence of lesions 
(neurodegeneration). An example of basic 
neuronal change in response to the social 
environment involves stress. If our environ-
ment’s demands systematically exceed our 
capacity, chronic stress might result, and, 
through the release of cortisol, lead to the 
shrinkage of neuronal dendrites and a pre-
disposition to psychiatric disorders such as 
depression (McEwen 2012). This and many 
other examples cast doubt on the idea of a 
“standard” brain, which underlies most brain 
localization studies, and remind us that the 
brain is dynamic and it adapts to our environ-
ment not only in an evolutionary sense, but 
also within the scope of every individual life.
2.3 Beyond f MRI: Processes and the EEG
It is probably safe to say that functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies 
are the face of neuroeconomics, and most 
economists will immediately associate one 
with the other. Neuroscience, in contrast, 
relies on a mixture of methods, of which fMRI 
2 The hippocampus is related to memory in general and 
spatial memory in particular, and seems to be crucial for 
complex spatial representations. To emphasize the cave-
ats raised in the previous section, however, it should be 
remarked that it is not the only brain region associated with 
such functions. In particular, Maguire et al. (1998) argue 
that it is part of a “human navigation network.” 
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is an important one, but by no means the only 
one. Even though this point goes of course 
beyond the confines of social neuroscience, 
it is maybe important to make it clear at this 
point that not every neuroeconomic question 
must give rise to an fMRI study. Also, no dis-
cussion of developments and caveats for the 
future of neuroeconomics and social neuro-
science would be complete without address-
ing the limits of fMRI studies.
At the risk of stating the obvious, it should 
be remembered that fMRI images do not 
represent neural activity, but rather a cor-
relate thereof. The signal underlying such 
images, called “blood oxygen level depen-
dent” or BOLD signal, represents changes in 
blood flow, which is assumed to occur after 
oxygen-consuming neural activity has taken 
place. Since blood flow is slow, fMRI images 
present indirect evidence of where activity 
might have occurred in a large time window 
(two seconds in the best of cases, which, for 
brain activity, is extremely long). That is, 
fMRI concentrates on where, not on when. 
Even leaving aside the possibility that blood 
flow does not always reliably track neural 
activity (see Schleim and Roiser 2009, for a 
discussion), the broad time window creates 
an important problem, since different func-
tions of the same brain region, resulting in 
activity at different time points, will be nec-
essarily lumped together in fMRI measure-
ments. As a consequence, there are natural 
limits to what can be achieved with fMRI 
analyses in terms of mapping functions to 
brain regions or networks, and indeed some 
puzzling results in neuroeconomic studies 
might be due to the lumping nature of the 
BOLD signal.
It should also be remembered that the 
statistical analysis of fMRI data is far from 
trivial. Roughly, the colored renderings that 
illustrate such data represent levels of signif-
icance for coefficients estimated in particu-
lar voxels (three-dimensional pixels), say, for 
the comparison of a treatment group versus 
a control group. But the coefficients being 
compared are typically regression coeffi-
cients estimated at the particular voxel. A 
host of corrections and adjustments are per-
formed at different stages of the process, 
and most researchers simply apply those 
considered standard and incorporated in 
standardized software. Alas, the statistics 
of such multistage analyses are not entirely 
settled, and occasional polemics flare up in 
the neuroscience literature regarding their 
reliability. For instance, Vul et al. (2009) 
targeted studies in social neuroscience and 
argued that certain kinds of multistage analy-
sis might have artificially inflated significance 
levels in early studies in this field, especially 
when computing correlations between brain 
activity and personality-related scales. More 
recently, Eklund, Nichols, and Knutsson 
(2016) showed that possibly unwarranted 
assumptions on the spatial autocorrelation 
functions incorporated in certain software 
packages might have crucially affected a 
large number of fMRI studies in recent 
years, resulting in incorrectly low  p -values.
These comments are merely meant as a 
reminder that, first, fMRI is an indirect mea-
sure of brain localization with high spatial 
but low temporal resolution, and, second, 
fMRI analyses are comparatively young 
and involved, and the underlying statisti-
cal methods are still evolving. While fMRI 
studies are extremely valuable and pave the 
way to further analysis by, e.g., identifying 
the regions of interest, economists should 
be aware of the fact that neuroscience has 
other (cheaper!) tools at its disposal, some 
of which hold particular promise for the 
field of social neuroscience. The simplest 
and oldest such technique is the analysis of 
electrocortical brain activity by means of the 
electroencephalograph (EEG). Essentially, 
the technique directly measures actual brain 
activity (electricity), but does so by placing 
electrodes on the scalp. Source localization 
is far less precise than in the case of fMRI, 
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but temporal resolution is measured in milli-
seconds. EEG studies have developed a cat-
alogue of so-called event-related potentials 
(ERPs), which arise in response to specific 
classes of stimuli and whose latencies (times 
of occurrence) and peak amplitudes deliver 
information on the onset and intensity of 
brain processes. Different ERPs might orig-
inate in the same brain region, but the tem-
poral difference still allows for differentiated 
analysis. Additionally, the statistical tech-
niques necessary to analyze EEG data are 
often comparatively simple, as e.g., testing 
amplitude differences (measured in micro-
volts) across groups.
The seminal book on social neuroscience 
by Cacioppo, Visser, and Pickett (2006) 
included a detailed discussion of the use 
of ERPs for the study of social perception. 
Some more recent ERP studies have illus-
trated the potential interest of the technique 
for economic decision making, social and 
individual. As an example, an ERP com-
ponent called feedback-related negativity 
(FRN), generated in the anterior cingulate 
cortex around 250 ms after win/loss stimuli 
presentation, has been reliably associated 
with processes of reinforcement learning. 
By analyzing this component, Achtziger 
et al. (2015) showed that increased incen-
tives might result in increased reliance on 
reinforcement learning, but not necessar-
ily in higher performance. Since the ACC 
is involved in many other functions, ACC 
activity cannot be uniquely associated with 
 reinforcement learning (or vice versa, of 
course), and such a conclusion could not 
be directly drawn if one only knew that the 
ACC was active in a certain time window. 
Also interesting are applications pinning 
down when decisions are made, which can 
be done, e.g., by studying lateralized read-
iness potentials, which reflect the extent of 
motor preparation and indicate its onset, 
that is, when a decision maker is preparing 
to give one response or another by  pressing 
certain keys. In a belief-updating study, 
Achtziger et al. (2014) showed that decision 
makers prone to the conservatism bias (over-
weighting the prior compared to new sample 
information) tend to prepare their response 
before the new information is presented, 
showing that conservatism bias might often 
arise from a base-rate-only heuristic where 
sample information is ignored (as proposed 
by Navon 1978 and Gigerenzer and Hoffrage 
1995), and not from failures in informa-
tion aggregation or retrieval (as argued by 
Edwards, 1982 or Dougherty, Gettys, and 
Ogden 1999). Obviously, such a conclusion 
(which helps separate different theories on 
faulty economic decision making) relies on 
the temporal precision of the EEG and can-
not be obtained on the basis of choice data, 
response times, or fMRI measurements.
Neuroeconomics, through its focus on 
reward and valuation, has so far devoted a 
great deal of attention to the neurotrans-
mitter dopamine and the dopaminergic 
pathways of the brain. As neuroeconomics 
advances, other neurotransmitters and path-
ways will become relevant. Although EEG 
studies in isolation can, of course, not dis-
tinguish among neurotransmitters, the tem-
poral resolution they provide, as well as the 
possibility to focus on very early reactions, 
will make them invaluable. Consider pro-
cesses of attention, which are closely related 
to motivation and are hence essential for 
both decision and social neuroscience stud-
ies. Motivationally relevant stimuli elicit the 
release of the neurotransmitter noradrena-
line, which promotes alertness and focuses 
attention.3 Noradrenaline release results 
3 Noradrenaline is chemically related to adrenaline, but 
it plays a role in the neural system. In the United States, 
they are called norepinephrine and epinephrine since the 
word “adrenalin” was trademarked by a pharmaceutical 
firm (Tansey 1995). The names are translations of each 
other. Ad renes and epi nephros are just references to the 
suprarenal glands (above the kidneys) synthesizing adrena-
line, respectively in Latin and Greek. 
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in activity throughout a network of brain 
regions innervated by the  noradrenergic 
pathways. The onset, however, is on the 
locus coeruleus (LC), an anatomically deep 
structure located in the brain stem. The ini-
tial reaction is extremely fast (100 –150 ms), 
and the noradrenergic system (called locus 
coeruleus–noradrenergic or LC–NA sys-
tem) is relatively broad, hence it is difficult 
to pinpoint natural targets for fMRI studies 
addressing specific processes of attention 
and arousal. However, the EEG provides 
natural, easy-to-measure correlates of such 
processes, in the form of two ERP compo-
nents called P3a and P3b. Those have been 
argued to correspond to early activity in the 
LC–NA system (Nieuwenhuis, Aston-Jones, 
and Cohen 2005; Walz et al. 2013). The P3a, 
of lateral-prefrontal origin, is associated with 
novel or salient stimuli. The P3b, probably 
originating in or near the temporoparietal 
junction (which, as we will discuss below, 
plays an important role in the “social brain”), 
responds to infrequent or motivationally sig-
nificant stimuli (e.g., large gains and losses; 
Yeung and Sanfey 2004) and is moderated by 
deliberate attention.
Since frequency and consistency are 
closely related, ERPs such as the P3b are 
particularly useful to obtain insights on 
social attitudes. A year after the seminal con-
tribution on social neuroscience (Cacioppo 
and Berntson 1992), Cacioppo et al. (1993) 
pointed out that the P3b is more pronounced 
when a target word is inconsistent with con-
text words, even if the inconsistency depends 
on subjective evaluations, for instance when 
a word with a subjectively negative evalua-
tion appears within a series of positive words. 
This opened the door to a series of designs 
assessing social attitudes that do not rely on 
participants’ self-reports. Hence, the P3b 
and related components can be used to esti-
mate social attitudes when self-reports are 
likely to fail (e.g., racial attitudes; see Ito, 
Thompson, and Cacioppo 2004). This adds 
to a collection of ERPs that are used to eval-
uate social attitudes and their appearance. 
For instance, Ito and Urland (2003) used 
ERPs to show that both gender and race are 
differentiated within 200 ms (!) in the human 
brain, which suggests that attempts to build 
rationalistic models of social attitudes might 
be overoptimistic (see also Hügelschäfer, 
Jaudas, and Achtziger 2016).4 Indeed, an 
especially interesting fact is that the ERPs 
employed in such studies are extremely fast 
(occurring way before conscious thought). 
For instance, the N170 (whose name refers 
to a negative deflection occurring around 
170 ms after stimuli presentation) responds 
selectively to faces. Ratner and Amodio 
(2013) found larger N170 to ingroup com-
pared with outgroup faces, where the groups 
were exogenously defined according to a 
minimal-group paradigm (Tajfel and Turner 
1986). Such insights exemplify how the EEG 
technique, with its high temporal resolution, 
can contribute to social neuroscience along 
dimensions unreachable for fMRI research 
(for a recent review and other examples, see 
e.g., Amodio, Bartholow, and Ito 2014).
3. A Brief Historical Perspective of the 
Field
The previous section has attempted to pro-
vide context in the form of recent trends and 
developments, formulated as broad caveats. 
A further and equally important caveat arises 
from the past. Every scientific discipline nat-
urally develops a certain path dependence, 
eventually redefining itself along the way.
Schutt, Seidman, and Keshavan’s (2015) 
book creates the impression that social 
neuroscience might be on the verge of just 
4 ERP research has consistently shown that certain 
kinds of economically relevant stimuli elicit extremely 
early neural responses. For instance, the FRN mentioned 
above, which typically peaks around or before 250 ms after 
stimuli presentation, responds to high versus low economic 
rewards. 
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such a redefinition. However, it is arguable 
whether the discipline covered by that text 
is actually the broad field of social neurosci-
ence as envisioned by Cacioppo, Visser, and 
Pickett (2006). There are significant depar-
tures. While neuroeconomics and the more 
psychologically savvy parts of behavioral 
economics are converging into the broader 
“neuropsychoeconomics,” which might eas-
ily be conceived to encompass social neu-
roscience, the developments covered in the 
book of Schutt, Seidman, and Keshavan 
(2015) sketch a field which, with apologies, 
might be more properly called “neurosocio-
psychiatry,” understood as the confluence of 
sociology and the well-established field of 
neuropsychiatry. Of course, labels are far less 
important than the actual content, but in this 
case, the latter label would more appropri-
ately convey the motivations (and the prob-
lems) underlying this trend. Sociology and 
psychiatry come with heavy historical bag-
gage that is absent in other disciplines (such 
as economics or psychology) and which has 
strongly influenced their development, and 
so it is convenient to briefly recapitulate that 
baggage here, following, in part, the intro-
ductory chapter of Schutt, Seidman, and 
Keshavan (2015).
Sociology has been allergic to contact 
with the biological sciences for a long time. 
The reasons are understandable. Some early 
sociologists supported social Darwinism 
(Bannister 1973), which was in turn used 
to justify the racist policies of the German 
Third Reich. Postwar sociology, hence, 
attempted to steer clear of any discus-
sion of biological foundations, a tendency 
only reinforced by the continued attempts 
to give pseudoscientific foundations to 
antisemitism in Europe and discrimination 
against blacks in the United States (Degler 
1991). In the process, many sociologists 
developed a taboo mentality with respect to 
any attempt to  examine possible biological 
foundations (genetic or neuroscientific) of 
their science.5 While this might have been 
an understandable defense mechanism, it 
was not conducive to further the interdis-
ciplinary exchange. Interestingly, this reac-
tion also contributed to setting sociology 
apart from economics, as the former came 
to define sociological phenomena as strictly 
external to the individual, while the latter 
attempted to build models of both indi-
vidual and aggregate behavior (micro- and 
macroeconomics, respectively). This focus 
on the social as surpassing all individual 
causes is especially strange since, contrary 
to economics, sociology has never aban-
doned mental illness as a subject of study. 
Sociological studies on mental health, how-
ever, have concentrated on external factors, 
deriving data, e.g., from community studies 
(Mirowsky and Ross 2003). It is only very 
recently that sociology has started to look 
beyond the social towards the neurobiolog-
ical, and hence the new “neurosociopsychi-
atry” field is younger and less developed 
than, say, neuroeconomics.
Psychiatry, on the other hand, has moved 
back and forth between the purely social and 
the purely biological approach along its his-
tory (Grob 1994), consistently failing to find 
an equilibrium until very recently. Towards 
the end of the nineteenth century, the asy-
lums (state psychiatric institutions) were 
born of the misconception that a socially 
ordered environment would suffice to cure 
mental illness. Instead, these institutions 
did active harm by isolating the mentally 
ill from the natural social  environment that 
their brains were supposed to  interact with 
5 As Russell K. Schutt explains in chapter 10 of Schutt, 
Seidman, and Keshavan (2015), an added factor was that 
the founding fathers of sociology, such as Emile Durkheim 
and Max Weber, understood psychology and evolution-
ary biology as focusing primarily on the individual, to the 
exclusion of explicitly social factors. It was first the polemic 
discussion of group selection in modern evolutionary sci-
ences (see, e.g., Wilson and Sober 1994) which sparked the 
sociologists’ interest, as exemplified by the work on cultural 
evolution (Boyd and Richerson 1988, 2009). 
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(Rothman 1990). Faced with an increasing 
population of mental patients and starved 
for results, from the 1920s to the 1950s 
psychiatrists turned to physically invasive 
but poorly founded interventions ranging 
from electroshocks to lobotomy, which in 
the long run did little to improve the repu-
tation of psychiatry (or the mental health of 
patients). In the second half of the twenti-
eth century, as the recklessness of previous 
approaches became better understood, psy-
chiatry adopted a sociological view of human 
behavior where many mental illnesses such 
as depression were viewed as having social 
roots. The growth of psychoanalysis, with 
its flat-out rejection of biology and its reli-
ance on anecdotal data, further led to the 
expansion of the nonbiological view also 
for other,  less-understood maladies like 
schizophrenia, which were assumed to 
arise from the patient’s “mind” and (child-
hood) experiences, but to have no biolog-
ical basis. Progress along this path was, of 
course, slow, and the discipline had to wait 
until the 1980s to see significant advances 
in treatment, thanks to the advent of phar-
macotherapy, which brought psychiatry 
and medicine closer together. As a conse-
quence, in the last decades of the twentieth 
century, psychiatry distanced itself from the 
sociological view in favor of a reliance on 
psychopharmaca.
Around the turn of the century, a sim-
plified view of the situation was that both 
sociology and psychiatry were interested in 
human mental illnesses, but they had taken 
fundamentally opposing views. Sociology 
was firmly entrenched in a “macro” view, 
rejecting any neurobiological approach, 
while psychiatry had become a subdisci-
pline of medicine, focusing on the biological 
approach with an emphasis on psychophar-
maca. Then, both disciplines started con-
verging towards a middle point. There were 
two big reasons for this movement.
First, as discussed in section 2.2, discover-
ies related to epigenetics and neuroplasticity 
made clear that biological and social factors 
could not be clearly separated, and progress 
required a more integrative view. Second, 
there was a widespread impression that 
the purely neurobiological approach had 
failed to deliver on its promises regarding 
mental illness. In the late 1990s and early 
2000s, improved understanding of neu-
rotransmitters led to the development of a 
so-called second generation of antipsychotic 
medications, which were then extensively 
tested under the auspices and control of the 
National Institute of Mental Health. Alas, 
the new drugs were found to be no more 
effective than the  first-generation ones (e.g., 
Lieberman et al. 2005). Likewise, titanic 
efforts within the framework of the Human 
Genome Project have so far failed to fully 
identify the genetic causes of illnesses such 
as schizophrenia. The heritability of schizo-
phrenia, that is, the proportion of the dis-
ease’s variation explained by genetic factors, 
is currently estimated at 0.7, which is rela-
tively high, but genetics alone seems unable 
to explain its onset. In both cases, it became 
clear that something was missing from the 
picture. The bottom line of Schutt, Seidman, 
and Keshavan (2015) is that the next step 
is the study of the interaction between the 
brain and the social environment, and how 
each influences the other. However, this 
step should not be seen as synonymous with 
the confluence of sociology and psychiatry, 
for such an approach would run the risk of 
reinventing wheels that have already been 
running for some time in economics and 
psychology.
4. The Social Brain
At a very general level, “social brain” is just 
a short expression for the set of brain struc-
tures and functions related to the perception 
and evaluation of the social environment, 
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and how that perception and evaluation 
affects social decision making. Its function 
can be roughly identified with “social cog-
nition and emotion,” a description whose 
meaning has changed over the decades but 
which is currently broadly taken to describe 
the set of cognitive abilities needed to pro-
cess and interpret social and emotional 
information arising both from oneself and 
others. The social brain is an evolutionarily 
recent development, involving an extensive 
network of brain regions. Current consen-
sus indicates that its basic structure is built 
around frontotemporal pathways connecting 
frontal executive regions (in the prefrontal 
cortex) to phylogenetically older regions in 
and near the temporal lobes. The following 
subsections summarize some key insights on 
the evolution and structure of the human 
social brain.
4.1 Evolution
Evolution is not a highly efficient process, 
nor is it a mechanism designed to achieve a 
result. It is merely the result of blind selection 
forces among the alternatives that happen 
to be available by sheer chance (mutation), 
with no guarantee that an optimum will be 
reached in any reasonably defined space. 
Our brain is not a wonderful machine: it is a 
patchwork organ made through kludges, an 
electrical machine that is permanently wet 
and where the most important parts are built 
on the surface, where damage is more likely. 
In other words, an idealized, efficient view of 
evolution would have the brain acquire char-
acteristics maximizing survival chances given 
the environment, never investing any effort 
in anything else. However, the reality is that 
each characteristic that is selected for might 
and often does have “unintended” conse-
quences, which then produce behavior that is 
not necessarily adaptive, let alone maximally 
so. This has two important consequences. 
First, it produces a bidirectionality between 
the environment and the brain. Given the 
environment (physical and social), evolution-
ary forces shape the brain. But changes in 
the brain produce changes in behavior that 
alter the physical and social reality, and not 
always in an adaptive way. Second, a partic-
ular kludge in the brain might make certain 
failures and breakdowns particularly likely, 
especially if the environment changes. Such 
breakdowns are the domain of psychiatry, 
and they are eminently informative about 
the functioning of the brain. It is then easy to 
argue that psychiatric malfunctions related 
to social behavior provide invaluable infor-
mation on the functioning of the social brain.
It is instructive to briefly summarize the 
milestones of the evolution of the human 
brain, as far as our current understanding 
allows, especially as it will result in some 
rather counterintuitive claims, and hope-
fully increased understanding of how our 
emotional and social mindset came to be. 
Chapter 3 of Schutt, Seidman, and Keshavan 
(2015), written by sociologist Jonathan H. 
Turner, provides a compact overview. The 
first milestone has to be placed 65 million 
years ago, when a meteorite impact wiped 
out the dinosaurs and many other of our plan-
et’s lifeforms. Small rodent-like mammals 
survived and took refugee in the arboreal 
habitats of Africa. The key realization about 
arboreal habitats is that they are eminently 
three-dimensional, as opposed to the plains: 
predators can also get at you from above and 
below. Adaptation to these habitats required 
a switch and substantial brain rewiring plac-
ing vision as the dominant sense (as opposed 
to smell or hearing). Incidentally, and as an 
accidental byproduct, the rewiring resulted 
in a substantial development of the so-called 
association cortices around the inferior pari-
etal lobe, where the lobes associated with 
different senses meet. It turns out that this 
development is the fundamental prerequi-
site for the capacity for language. This happy 
accident explains why some of our cousins, 
such as the great apes, have the capacity for 
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language even though anatomical constraints 
prevent them from actually developing it.
The second milestone comes from the fact 
that our ancestors were defeated, in evo-
lutionary terms. We are, quite literally, the 
descendants of losers who had to go through 
quite radical changes as a consequence of 
their defeat. The rodent-like mammals even-
tually evolved into two broad classes of pri-
mates, the apes and the monkeys. Naturally, 
they competed for resources in the arboreal 
habitats. Around 23 million years ago, our 
ancestors the apes were defeated by the mon-
keys and pushed away from the core regions 
of the arboreal habitats. The reason was one 
random mutation that allowed monkeys 
(but not apes) to digest unripe fruit, thereby 
consuming this resource before apes could 
access it. Our distant forefathers were forced 
to the fringes of the habitat, where vege-
tation is less dense and branches offer less 
support. Gone was the possibility to sustain 
large groups and, as a direct consequence, 
natural selection created individualistic 
apes, lacking the intuitive group-formation 
tendencies that monkeys have. As a second 
consequence, since fringe areas are far more 
dangerous (one false step leads to a fall, and 
predators might abound), survival selected 
in favor of increased dexterity and increased 
intelligence.
Around 10–14 million years ago, the 
African forests began to recede, and apes 
were forced onto the plains. Random evo-
lutionary events had endowed them with 
relative intelligence, dexterity, and the 
potential for language, but had taken away 
any tendencies for stable group formation. 
The problems created by a highly  developed 
brain without the stabilizing factor of 
group-formation instincts persist to this day.
Gorillas, chimpanzees, and orangutans build 
notoriously unstable group structures (com-
pared to other animals), and it is likely that 
this was also true for our ancestors. Humans 
are descended from individualistic apes 
with very weak social tendencies. Hence, 
the often-spouted claim that humans are 
social animals is, simply put, at odds with 
all available evidence, and seems to arise 
from “wishful thinking” related to cultural 
(Western) values. This is a fundamental real-
ization for social neuroscience and econom-
ics. Of course, the human brain has adapted 
to facilitate social interactions. But this is a 
forced and problematic adaptation, which 
goes against a previous adaptation that took 
away social group-formation tendencies. It 
does not take much to expect trouble arising 
from the “social brain,” since, in evolutionary 
terms, it amounts to a recent patch on top of 
an individualistic brain.
Ever since the great apes left the forest, 
groups have had an evolutionary advan-
tage over individuals, and indeed while 
group-forming monkeys flourished, indi-
vidualistic great apes have become almost 
extinct (except for humans). Humans are 
simply the great apes for which evolutionary 
forces were able to partially undo what had 
been previously done. Comparative analysis 
of the brains of humans and contemporary 
great apes suggests that this adaptation took 
place by altering existing structures, rather 
than developing new ones. This is specially 
true for subcortical structures, mostly unre-
lated to the development of intelligence. 
For instance, the human amygdala (which 
in lower animals is essentially the center 
for fear and anger) is twice as large as in 
great apes (controlling for body size), and 
the human septum (where sexual pleasure 
arises) is twice as large as in chimpanzees, 
even though the latter are far more sex-
crazed than we are. As Jonathan Turner spec-
ulates, a possible explanation is that these 
centers have been hijacked by evolution in 
order to create a complex pattern of emo-
tions as a kludge to sustain social stability and 
group formation in a species that previously 
evolved away from such tendencies. This 
provides a (controversial) view of  emotions 
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as feeble attempts to replace long-gone 
group-formation tendencies and strengthen 
group ties. Mental health and well-being are 
closely related to emotions, and hence it is 
easy to see that many of the problems of con-
temporary humans arise from the particular 
evolutionary path followed by our ancestors.
4.2 Theory of Mind and the Social Brain
In evolutionary terms, hence, it could be 
argued that the “social brain” developed to 
allow for group formation and reap the bene-
fits of cooperation in a species which had pre-
viously gone down the individualistic path. 
This view, however, is incomplete, for along 
the way, something amazing happened. The 
great apes started developing the capacity 
to mentalize, that is, the capacity to under-
stand other individuals’ minds. A classical 
mentalizing test is the so-called “false-belief 
paradigm.” In this experimental setting, sub-
jects observe a different actor who sees an 
object being placed inside location A. Then, 
the observer sees how somebody else moves 
the object from location A to location B, but, 
crucially, the observed actor does not witness 
this change. The test is whether the subject 
is able to anticipate that the observed actor 
will act on the basis of false beliefs, looking 
for the object in location A even though the 
subject knows that it is actually in location B. 
Passing the test shows that the subject is 
capable of understanding that other individ-
uals might have different perceptions about 
the world. This capacity is absent in monkeys 
(and in human children below age four), but 
is not an exclusively human trait. Rather, 
it seems to be present, in varying degrees, 
in all species of apes (Povinelli and Bering 
2002). Indeed, a very recent study has shown 
that great apes pass the classical false-belief 
test (Krupenye et al. 2016). Hence, it seems 
very likely that the mentalizing capacity 
(like the capacity for language) is one of the 
many evolutionary accidents that occurred 
as a consequence of our ancestors’ troubles 
 dating back to their expulsion from the for-
ests by the victorious monkeys.6
The study of mentalizing, or theory of 
mind, is one of the great pillars of social neu-
roscience. The importance of the concept 
is rather easy to understand for an econo-
mist, as it essentially parallels the difference 
between decision theory and game theory. In 
the former, an economic agent should sim-
ply optimize his or her preferences, while in 
the latter it is necessary to develop a theory 
regarding other agents’ actions. This is pre-
cisely what is captured by the general con-
cept of theory of mind. It can be defined as 
the capacity to understand somebody else’s 
mind, that is, to construct a mental repre-
sentation of somebody else’s motivation, 
intentions, knowledge, and beliefs (see, e.g., 
Singer and Tusche 2014). Hence, when econ-
omists attempt to give epistemic foundations 
to equilibrium concepts in interpersonal sit-
uations, they are essentially appealing to the-
ory of mind.
It is important to distinguish theory of 
mind from related but fundamentally dif-
ferent concepts as, e.g., empathy. The latter 
refers to the capacity to share the feelings 
of others. For instance, psychopaths lack 
empathy, but are very good at theory of 
mind. They can cognitively understand other 
people’s motivations and hence manipulate 
them, but will do so without regard to the 
other’s possible suffering (Blair 2005, 2008). 
In this sense, the classical Homo economicus, 
let loose in a social situation, is nothing else 
than a psychopath. Symmetrically, modern 
economic models of “social preferences,” 
where the welfare of others is taken into 
account, can be seen as an attempt to incor-
porate empathy into economics (but not nec-
essarily theory of mind).
6 Interestingly, some species of dogs are able to con-
sider what a human can or cannot see, which might point 
to a rudimentary theory of mind (Kaminski et al. 2009 and 
Kaminski, Pitsch, and Tomasello 2013). 
Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LVI (March 2018)250
The term “social brain,” however, does not 
yet correspond to a clearly defined concept 
at this point. Refining our previous attempt 
at a definition, it refers to the collection of 
brain regions that have been associated 
with social cognition, that is, our capacity to 
understand others’ emotions, intentions, and 
motivations. Early studies (Adolphs 2001) 
listed a large number of regions involved in 
social reasoning, including large parts of the 
prefrontal cortex, the amygdala, and lateral 
regions (in the temporal cortex), and this 
is briefly discussed in chapter 2 of Schutt, 
Seidman, and Keshavan (2015), written by 
Matcheri S. Keshavan (see also chapter 5 of 
Cacioppo, Visser, and Pickett 2006), followed 
by a more detailed exposition in chapter 4 (by 
Paul G. Nestor, Victoria Coate, and Ashley 
Shirai). Essentially, the social brain appears 
to encompass a “frontotemporal link,” that 
is, it arises as the result of the interaction of 
regions in the temporal lobe and regions in 
the prefrontal cortex. Recent research, how-
ever, suggests that what is called “the social 
brain” is actually a set of several, differen-
tiated networks accomplishing related but 
differentiated functions. The theory-of-mind 
network (see figure 1) comprises the medial 
prefrontal cortex (MPFC), which is also part 
of the reward valuation network as discussed 
above, and a collection of regions in the tem-
poral cortex: the temporoparietal junction 
(TPJ; we encountered this region previously 
as the probable origin of the P3b measured 
in the EEG7), the superior temporal sulcus 
(STS), and the temporal poles (TP). A num-
ber of other regions and subregions have 
also been ascribed to the network, but, as 
argued by Spunt and Adolphs (2014), this 
might be due to the large variety of tasks 
7 Mars et al. (2012b) argue that little is known about the 
neuroanatomy of the TPJ. In particular, they suggest that 
only the posterior part of the TPJ should be considered a 
node in the social brain, while the anterior part interacts 
with areas more associated with attentional control. 
used to measure theory of mind. In a recent 
meta-analysis encompassing seventy-three 
fMRI studies, Schurz et al. (2014) found that 
a particular “core network” engaged for all 
theory-of-mind tasks, including the MPFC 
and the bilateral TPJ. Comparable results 
were obtained by Spunt and Adolphs (2014) 
with a new “why/how” task designed to single 
out the basic idea of mentalizing (strangely, 
the evidence of Spunt and Adolphs 2014 
and Schurz et al. 2014 is not mentioned 
in Schutt, Seidman, and Keshavan 2015). 
These developments make clear that men-
talizing appears to be an identifiable, sep-
arable process in the human brain, distinct 
from other social processes. For instance, 
the “empathy network” appears to be quite 
different, including the medial anterior cin-
gulate cortex (essentially located “behind” 
and next to the MPFC) and the anterior 
insula, among other regions (Singer and 
Tusche 2014).
This is precisely a point where a discipline of 
neurosociopsychiatry might miss out a crucial 
insight. Microeconomics in general and game 
theory in particular is ripe with paradigms 
requiring theory of mind, even if the termi-
nology is usually different. Neuroeconomic 
studies employing games as the ultimatum 
game or the prisoner’s dilemma have targeted 
prefrontal regions as regions of interest, and 
have frequently observed activation of the 
MPFC. This is, of course, consistent with the 
involvement of the theory-of-mind network. 
For instance, Rilling et al. (2004) examined 
subjects playing the ultimatum game and the 
prisoner’s dilemma game with both (alleged) 
human and computer partners, and observed 
stronger activation for human partners in 
typical theory-of-mind areas. Coricelli and 
Nagel (2009) used the beauty-contest game, 
which requires iterative thinking involving 
others, and found that high-level reason-
ing correlated with activity in the MPFC. 
This  connection, which is not made explicit 
in Schutt, Seidman, and Keshavan (2015), 
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is  sufficient to make clear why social neuro-
science is important for economics and vice 
versa.
It is also worth noting that the relation of 
mentalizing to recursive or iterative thinking 
might lie at the basis of an open question 
in social neuroscience. Interestingly, it has 
been shown that there are major overlaps 
between the theory-of-mind network and 
the default mode network or DMN (see fig-
ure 1). Specifically (see Mars et al. 2012a), 
the medial frontal cortex (including the 
MPFC) and the (area around the) TPJ are 
considered nodes of the DMN, and a further 
node, the posterior cingulate cortex, plays a 
role in attributing mental states to others. 
It is worth remembering that the DMN is 
typically identified by looking at brain areas 
whose activity increases during “rest” blocks, 
compared to specific activities. The two net-
works might hence seem to have quite unre-
lated functions, begging the question of what 
the reason for the significant overlap might 
be. However, far from being a “resting net-
work,” the DMN is associated with inter-
nal mentation and recursive thinking (for 
example, the DMN is active when planning, 
thinking about one’s future, etc), functions 
which are presumably also important for 
social cognition and mentalizing.
4.3 Social Valuation and Social Preferences
Mentalizing is one of the main functions of 
the social brain, and probably the most rele-
vant for economics. However, several other 
broad categories of interest fall squarely 
within the domain of social neuroscience 
(see, e.g., Schutt, Seidman, and Keshavan 
2015, chapter 5). Also relevant for econom-
ics is social perception, which includes the 
perception, interpretation, and evaluation of 
social stimuli.
Indeed, the presence of the MPFC (or 
specific parts thereof) in the  theory-of-mind 
network and, more generally, among the 
regions forming the substrate of the social 
brain, is especially relevant for economics. As 
mentioned in section 2.1, parts of this brain 
region can probably be conceived as encoding 
value, akin to economic utility, after receiv-
ing reinforcement-based feedback from the 
dopaminergic pathways. The question is 
whether the medial prefrontal cortex gen-
erally encodes all kinds of  decision-related 
value or just a specific, self-centered kind. In 
more economic terms, is social decision mak-
ing separate from, say, consumption-based 
decision making? In classical economics, one 
would start with the appropriate space of 
outcomes and define (complete) preferences 
on it. If outcomes include distributional allo-
cations affecting other individuals, that is just 
one more dimension in the space, causing no 
 formal-mathematical difficulty whatsoever 
to the approach. Implicitly, that “economic 
view” postulates a unique type of value 
computation, where the different outcomes 
(whether they incorporate the welfare of 
others or not) are compared using a globally 
defined preference relation. The literature 
on social preferences is eminently orthodox 
in this respect, for it simply proposes specific 
functional forms for such global preferences.
The question, however, is unresolved at 
this point. On the one hand, a single-prefer-
ence theory naturally arising from the classi-
cal microeconomic approach would postulate 
that social and nonsocial valuation processes 
should be implemented in the same neural 
structures. In this case, in view of evidence 
from nonsocial decision making, the ventro-
medial prefrontal cortex is the natural can-
didate as the region aggregating the various 
neural signals into a coherent preference (or 
value). On the other hand, a separated-pref-
erences theory would postulate that social 
valuations are achieved by a differentiated 
set of neural structures, possibly overlapping 
but not identical with the ones managing 
nonsocial valuations. This important ques-
tion is strangely absent in Schutt, Seidman, 
and Keshavan (2015), but a good recent 
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review can be found in Ruff and Fehr (2014). 
Certain aspects of social interactions, as, 
e.g., receiving social approval or disapproval, 
seem to be linked to the same brain regions 
involved in the processing of nonsocial 
rewards. Further, several studies show that 
behavior conforming with normative social 
principles (e.g., equity or cooperation) 
leads to increased activity in  reward-related 
areas, larger than that observed in control 
conditions with similar payoffs but no social 
framing (e.g., Rilling et al. 2002). Overall, 
evidence suggests that social behavior is 
controlled by a network that is function-
ally very close to the RVN. However, it is 
unclear whether it is actually the same net-
work or, rather, social and nonsocial val-
ues are managed by overlapping regions 
or different subregions of the same areas 
(different, specialized neurons within the 
same broad area). The latter view agrees 
with single-neuron analysis from nonhu-
man primates (see Ruff and Fehr 2014 for a 
detailed review of the evidence).
4.4 Emotion Processing and Regulation
Two other broad functions of the social 
brain are emotion processing (includ-
ing recognition and expression) and self- 
regulation, understood as the process by 
which humans regulate both their own 
internal emotional states and the influence 
of social and emotional stimuli on them. 
Regarding emotion processing and regula-
tion, one of the key nodes in the relevant 
network, that received much attention in 
early neuroeconomic studies, is the amyg-
dala. As mentioned in section 4.1 above, the 
human amygdala greatly increased in size 
as the result of our particular evolutionary 
path. It is, hence, not surprising that the 
amygdala plays multiple roles in the social 
brain. A number of studies have shown that 
patients with amygdala damage suffer from 
difficulties in processing emotional infor-
mation, especially fear. Further, if damage 
occurs during developmental age, patients 
develop many abnormal patterns of social 
behavior (see, e.g., chapter 2 of Cacioppo, 
Visser, and Pickett 2006).
Chapter 5 of Schutt, Seidman, and 
Keshavan (2015), written by Christine 
Hooker, is mostly devoted to a review of the 
author’s research on the role of the amyg-
dala in social cognition and social behavior. 
Interestingly, this research shows that the 
amygdala also plays an important role in 
social learning, for instance when learning 
the emotional value of stimuli (including 
threat and reward values). That is, the amyg-
dala seems to be crucial for creating associa-
tions between stimuli and learned emotional 
values. Social learning, however, can be mal-
adaptive, in the sense that if the amygdala 
“overreacts,” exaggerated associations (e.g., 
fear) can be reinforced, leading to anxiety 
disorders. The evidence reviewed by Hooker 
shows that exaggerated amygdala response is 
associated with the neuroticism personality 
trait, that is, people with high neuroticism rat-
ings exhibit higher amygdala activity during 
social learning and are, hence, most likely 
at risk of developing anxiety disorders. Also, 
the social environment interacts with amyg-
dala reactions. For instance, an emotionally 
reactive significant other can become a neg-
ative externality, leading to a magnification 
of inappropriate responses contributing to 
anxiety disorders, as, e.g., PTSD or phobias.
The self-regulation of emotional states is, 
of course, closely related to the cognitive 
control network. Hooker concentrates on 
couples’ studies showing that the lateral pre-
frontal cortex (especially its ventral part) is 
crucial to regulate and inhibit amygdala reac-
tions, e.g., allowing to recover from inter-
personal conflicts. Deficits in this region’s 
activity might be associated with disorders 
as social anhedonia, a state where pleasure 
from social relationships is diminished, which 
itself is related to  schizophrenia-related 
symptoms.
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4.5 Social Networks and the Social Brain
The structure of our immediate social 
environment is obviously an important 
determinant of our behavior and an import-
ant factor in our (mental) health. An extreme 
example is discussed in chapter 11 of Schutt, 
Seidman, and Keshavan (2015), where 
Bernice Pescosolido makes the point that 
differences in social network structure and 
connectedness are a major determinant in 
suicidal behavior. The natural question, how-
ever, is to what extent the feedback link from 
our social world to the social brain can be 
demonstrated and quantified. As mentioned 
in section 2.2, idiosyncratic experiences can 
result in structural changes to the brain. Is 
this also true for the social brain?
At the evolutionary level, the social brain 
hypothesis (Dunbar 1998; Dunbar and 
Shultz 2007) states that human brains have 
expanded to their current size precisely due 
to the demands of social decision making and 
social cognition. Supporting this hypothesis, 
it is known that, across primate species, the 
size of social groups correlates with fron-
tal lobe volume. Further, if brain growth 
is linked (in evolutionary terms) to the 
demands of social cognition, it is maybe eas-
ier to understand that, as discussed above, 
the human default mode network might have 
evolved precisely to satisfy the demands of 
functions as mentalizing. Recent evidence, 
however, indicates that similar correlations 
might also hold across individuals, especially 
for specific brain regions corresponding to 
the theory-of-mind network. For instance, 
evidence from research on adult macaques 
involving pseudo-random assignment sug-
gests that living in larger social groups might 
causally result in structural brain changes, 
affecting the STS, the ACC, and the  (rostral) 
 prefrontal cortex (Sallet et al. 2011). In a 
study with adult humans, Bickart et al. (2011) 
found that amygdala volume correlates with 
the size and complexity of individual social 
networks. Also, Lewis et al. (2011) showed 
that gray-matter volume in the posterior 
frontal poles, the STS, and the (left) TPJ 
co-vary with mentalizing capacity, while 
gray-matter volume in the medial orbitof-
rontal cortex and other areas vary both with 
mentalizing capacity and social-network size. 
These examples suggest a tight, bidirectional 
link between our immediate social environ-
ment and (social) brain structure.
As argued at length by Lieberman (2013) 
and others, as a result of the coevolution of 
our brain and our social environment, social 
connections are fundamental for mental 
health. Even if, as argued by Turner (see 
section 4.1), evolution needed to tinker quite 
a bit to turn individualistic apes into social 
humans, in our current state, social proxim-
ity and interaction appear to be a necessary 
condition for a well-functioning brain.
5. The Failure of the Social Brain
Given the bidirectional link between the 
social world and the social brain, a simple 
thought experiment then leads to the conclu-
sion that large dysfunctions in social behavior 
are most likely associated with sharp struc-
tural brain anomalies, and going to these 
extreme cases might deliver information on 
the functioning and structure of the social 
brain. Hence we enter the domain of men-
tal illnesses, where the social environment 
is perturbed because of a dysfunction of the 
social brain, and society’s failures, where the 
social brain is damaged because of a dysfunc-
tion in the social world.
5.1 Schizophrenia and Other Mental 
Illnesses
Schizophrenia is a complex mental disor-
der that affects roughly one percent of the 
world population. Its most visible symptoms 
are of psychotic nature. Patients’ thinking 
patterns become disorganized, they might 
suffer from hallucinations (e.g., hearing 
Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LVI (March 2018)254
voices), and they often lose contact with real-
ity and develop delusions and false beliefs. 
Beyond such visible symptoms, schizophre-
nia is also associated with severe cognitive 
impairments affecting attention, working 
memory, and executive functions. Crucially, 
however, schizophrenia is characterized by 
what could be described as a breakdown of 
the social brain. Social cognition, including 
mentalizing, is severely impaired (patients 
might even experience difficulties interpret-
ing others’ facial expressions), followed by 
withdrawal and isolation. Cognitive impair-
ments and deficits in social cognition appear 
to be interconnected, and are largely unre-
sponsive to the medications used to treat the 
psychotic symptoms of the illness.
Schizophrenia is not the only mental ill-
ness related to dysfunctions of the social 
brain. Major depressive disorder is related 
to failures in the regulation of negative emo-
tions, while mania is related to failures in the 
regulation of positive emotions. Autism and 
Asperger’s Syndrome are associated with an 
extreme failure of theory of mind known as 
“mind blindness,” the inability to attribute 
mental states to others. However, schizophre-
nia is particularly relevant for the study of the 
social brain due to the pervasive deficits in 
social cognition it entails. As a result, a rather 
large part of Schutt, Seidman, and Keshavan 
(2015) is devoted to schizophrenia and its 
symptoms.8 In chapter 7 of that work, Junghe 
Lee, William P. Horan, and Michael F. Green 
describe the deficits in social cognition asso-
ciated with this illness in detail. In chapter 8, 
Jean Addington and Mariapaola Barbato 
undertake a comparable endeavor for those 
at high risk of developing psychotic disor-
ders (including schizophrenia). In chapter 5, 
Christine Hooker argues that a main process 
8 It should be mentioned, however, that this text’s focus 
on schizophrenia might not be representative of the field. 
For example, the study of this illnesss was absent in the 
earlier text of Cacioppo, Visser, and Pickett (2006). 
facilitating mentalizing is simulation, which, 
in lay terms, corresponds to putting  yourself 
in somebody else’s shoes. Simulation is 
known to be supported by the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), and evidence 
by Hooker shows that, in schizophrenia, the 
reduction of mentalizing skills is associated 
with a reduction of gray-matter volume in 
the VMPFC. Causality, however, is difficult 
to establish, especially in view of the bidi-
rectionality between social behavior and the 
structure of the social brain.
Recent research seems to indicate that, at a 
higher level, schizophrenia is associated with 
altered connectivity patterns among brain 
regions part of the “social brain” described 
above. Chapter 4 of Schutt, Seidman, and 
Keshavan (2015), written by Paul G. Nestor, 
Victoria Coate, and Ashley Shirai, reviews the 
neuroanatomic origins of psychopathological 
symptoms associated with schizophrenia and 
other mental disorders. Comparing patients 
with healthy controls performing different 
social and nonsocial tasks, and analyzing 
gray versus white matter in schizophrenic 
patients, a number of abnormalities have 
been identified. It is, of course, not possi-
ble to point to a single region as the origin 
of the disorder, because schizophrenia exists 
in many different grades and patients’ symp-
toms are far from uniform. However, two 
regularities are worth mentioning here, for 
they might provide insights toward a better 
understanding of the social brain.
The first important regularity is that 
schizophrenia seems to be associated with 
microstructural damage in the white matter 
of a region known as the cingulum bundle, 
which very rarely features as a region of 
interest in neuroeconomic studies. The rea-
son is that the cingulum bundle is not a real 
“actor” in the brain, but rather an anatomical 
bridge, a physical white-matter pathway con-
necting the anterior cingulate cortex and the 
frontal regions of the brain (VMPFC, OFC, 
and DLPFC). In particular, the cingulum 
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bundle is one of the pathways supporting the 
frontal-temporal communications that build 
the backbone of the social brain. The distur-
bance in the cingulum bundle might mean 
that what fails in this disease is not a particu-
lar region–function pair, but rather network 
connectivity. In schizophrenic patients, the 
ACC might fail to fully fulfill its role assist-
ing value formation as derived from the 
dopaminergic pathways. This is consistent 
with evidence studying neural responses in 
the striatum, a central brain structure where 
dopaminergic pathways from the substantia 
nigra end. As discussed in section 2.1, the 
striatum is a key node in the RVN, and activ-
ity in this region has been shown to correlate 
with reward prediction. Studies with schizo-
phrenic patients have shown abnormal stria-
tum-activity patterns in response to reward 
prediction errors. The link to the social brain 
is that reward learning through prediction 
and prediction errors is fundamental for 
understanding the intentions and actions of 
others, and hence a compromised process-
ing of reward prediction errors might lead to 
a disturbance in theory-of-mind processes. 
This line of reasoning might become part of 
an ultimate explanation for some of the most 
important symptoms of schizophrenia in the 
near future. However, the argument is far 
from entirely clear at this point. One prob-
lem is that activity in the striatum does not 
particularly reflect social prediction errors. 
Evidence by Behrens et al. (2008) shows 
that, while dopaminergic activity in the stri-
atum is indeed related to nonsocial reward 
prediction, prediction errors for social tasks 
elicit heightened activity in different areas, 
most notably the superior temporal sulcus 
and the temporoparietal junction, which, as 
mentioned above, are candidate nodes for 
the theory-of-mind network. A major prob-
lem with the thesis defended by Nestor and 
coauthors in chapter 4 of Schutt, Seidman, 
and Keshavan (2015) is that it ignores this 
nuance. However, this most likely simply 
reflects the current gaps in our knowledge. 
First, schizophrenia implies cognitive defi-
cits, and not only  social-cognitive ones, 
possibly arising from general problems 
in processing reward prediction. Second, 
the absence of specific and systematic evi-
dence at this point on similar abnormali-
ties in regions specifically associated with 
social reward prediction is not evidence of 
absence, but merely points at a natural ave-
nue for future research. Nestor and coau-
thors, however, might be (inadvertently) 
guilty of obscuring this point by basing their 
argument on the claim that “reinforcement 
learning via prediction error represents an 
all-purpose mechanism that is engaged in 
the processing of both social and nonsocial 
salient information” (Schutt, Seidman, and 
Keshavan 2015, pp. 91–2). As discussed in 
the previous section, this might be an exces-
sive simplification at this point.
The second important regularity is related 
to a basic dichotomy in the symptoms of 
schizophrenia, which are divided into “pos-
itive” and “negative” ones. The terminology 
can be confusing, because all the symptoms 
are quite negative from a personal-welfare 
point of view. Positive ones are those that 
refer to behavior and perceptions present in 
patients but not in healthy humans, and vice 
versa for negative ones. For instance, hallu-
cinations, delusions, and thought derailment 
are positive symptoms, while diminished 
levels of motivation and social responsive-
ness are negative symptoms. Evidence 
reviewed by Nestor and coauthors suggests 
that the dichotomy can be traced back to 
 schizophrenia-induced volume reductions in 
two different regions of the temporal lobes. 
Positive symptoms might be associated with 
volume reductions in the superior tempo-
ral gyrus, which is just a brain-surface ridge 
along the wedge called superior temporal 
sulcus that we have already discussed. This 
is particularly interesting because, since 
such temporal structures are integral to the 
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theory-of-mind network, the observed vol-
ume reduction might provide a bridge to 
the mechanisms by which schizophrenia 
ultimately disrupts the social brain. In par-
ticular, the superior temporal gyrus might be 
crucial for correctly attributing the source of 
our own speech to ourselves, and not to an 
external source. Negative symptoms, on the 
other hand, might be associated with volume 
reductions in the fusiform gyrus, which is 
also part of the temporal lobe. This structure 
has been consistently associated with facial 
recognition, and hence evidence gives rise to 
the natural hypothesis that deficits in facial 
recognition are at the root of many of the 
social-brain disruptions induced by schizo-
phrenia. Simply put (probably too simply), if 
stimuli as prediction errors cannot be reliably 
associated with social actors, the very process 
by which we successfully interact with our 
social environment might break down.
5.2 Orphans and Orphanages: Society’s 
Failure
Schizophrenia and other mental disorders 
serve as case studies for how the breakdown 
of the social brain results in impaired social 
behavior. An unfortunate series of natu-
ral experiments serves as illustration of the 
reverse link, that is, how a disruption of the 
social environment results in brain abnor-
malities. It has been known for a long time 
that, as a whole, children raised in orphan-
ages exhibit cognitive impairments (IQs 
lower than the normative mean, impaired 
global cognition, language difficulties) and 
behavioral problems (e.g., inattention and 
overactivity). This is, in itself, not surprising, 
for the link between reduced maternal care 
and abnormal behavior in adult age has been 
demonstrated even in rodents (see the review 
by Meaney 2001 or the one-page summary 
in chapter 11, p. 249, of Schutt, Seidman, 
and Keshavan 2015). Chapter 12 of Schutt, 
Seidman, and Keshavan (2015), written by 
Michael E. Behen and Harry T. Chugani, 
reviews evidence on brain development of 
human children raised in orphanages, focus-
ing on their own work, and including anal-
ysis of a relatively large sample ( N = 156 ) 
of children raised in Eastern European 
and Asian orphanages and later adopted in 
the United States. Other studies work with 
specific, “standard” samples such as the 
European and Romanian Adoptees (ERA) 
sample or the Bucharest Early Intervention 
Project (BEIP). Across samples, the evi-
dence speaks a clear language. There is a 
small window after birth (no more than six 
months) in which where the child is raised 
has little or no effect. After that, negative 
effects appear and become more severe with 
the length of time spent in the orphanage.
Effects are of two kinds: general cogni-
tive impairment and specific neurocognitive 
deficits ranging from attention and impulse- 
control problems to language-processing, 
memory, and manual-dexterity impairments. 
For example, roughly one third of the chil-
dren in Behen and Chugani’s sample had 
severely impaired global intellect, one third 
had no or minor global-intellect impairment 
but exhibited at least one specific neurocog-
nitive deficit, and only one third displayed no 
problems. However, this classification was 
correlated with time spent in the orphan-
age, with a later age of adoption associated 
with a larger likelihood of developing prob-
lems. A battery of brain measurements 
(PET, MRI, EEG) has been carried out in 
different subsamples compared to different 
control groups. The evidence reviewed by 
Behen and Chugani, mostly derived from 
PET and MRI studies of adopted children 
at  sample-average ages eight to ten, shows 
dysfunctions and structural anomalies in 
several brain regions. Those dysfunctions 
affect brain regions including the orbitofron-
tal cortex and lateral and medial temporal 
structures (the latter are involved in lan-
guage functions). Volumetric studies show 
increased amygdala volume and reduced 
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cortical thickness. MRI studies allowing 
to estimate the integrity of white-matter 
pathways show aberrant connectivities and 
abnormalities in limbic neural pathways. The 
areas involved are consistent with the brain 
functions affected by known impairments in 
orphanage-reared children. Further, results 
usually follow patterns showing a monoto-
nicity in length of institutionalization. Taken 
together, the evidence suggests that the cog-
nitive and behavioral problems arising from 
being raised in an orphanage result directly 
from changes in the children’s brains at early 
age.
Evidence from the EEG is especially 
interesting, because, unlike the fMRI, mea-
surements in the EEG are perfectly fea-
sible for very young children. Parker and 
Nelson (2005) and Parker, Nelson, and the 
Bucharest Early Intervention Project Core 
Group (2005) conducted ERP studies on 
facial recognition and discrimination (recall 
the N170 discussed in section 2.3) and found 
atypical patterns in orphanage-raised chil-
dren (age thirty months). Since facial recog-
nition can be seen as a basic building block 
for our perception of the social world, this 
evidence points to a very early dysfunction in 
the social brain. Further, in addition to ERP 
studies, the analysis of EEG frequencies is 
also informative. Different studies in dif-
ferent samples have found abnormalities in 
EEG frequency patterns, which have in turn 
been associated with inattentive-overactive 
symptoms.
It is unclear at this point whether the dam-
age is reversible. Different studies (see Behen 
and Chugani’s chapter for a detailed discus-
sion) have shown that, for instance, EEG 
patterns seem to approach normality after 
adoption for children placed earlier in fos-
ter care. Using a randomized controlled trial, 
Nelson et al. (2007) showed that Romanian 
orphans placed into foster care experienced 
improvements in cognition and behavior, 
compared to children who remained insti-
tutionalized. Such results point out that the 
plasticity of the brain might help repair some 
of the damage. However, neuroplasticity has 
its limits, and it seems likely that, in many 
cases, at least part of the effects of orphanage 
rearing in the children’s brains persist until 
adult age.
There are two main causes for the abnormal 
development of orphans’ brains, and each of 
them entails a lesson. The first is simply that 
orphanage rearing entails early social depri-
vation. As part of normal brain development, 
synapses that are not used often enough in 
the children’s brain are pruned. A socially 
deprived child will not develop a healthy 
social brain. Absence of a consistent primary 
caregiver after six months of age has severe 
negative consequences, revealing the folly of 
various social-design experiments and ideol-
ogies along human history. The second cause 
is stress. Even the best-run orphanage places 
children under prolonged stress, compared 
to a stable family environment. Many of the 
brain regions and pathways showing dys-
functions in the studies mentioned above are 
known to be damaged by prolonged stress.9 
Of course, unstable family environments will 
also generate stress, showing that the deci-
sion to bring a child into a problem-plagued 
family might require careful consideration.10
9 Increased stress levels and exaggerated responses to 
stress might go hand-in-hand in this case. Evidence from 
rodents (Meaney and Szyf 2005) shows that maternal 
grooming causes differences in DNA methylation patterns 
and affects a glucocorticoid receptor gene promoter in the 
hippocampus, whose expression in turn affects responses 
to stress. 
10 There is, however, a caveat to all studies on orphan-
age-raised children. Such children are often affected by 
other factors that might impair brain development, such 
as pre- and postnatal malnutrition or alcohol exposure. 
Appropriate statistical controls (for instance, through 
body-mass index) do not, in general, affect the findings, 
but, by the very nature of the data, the potential confound 
cannot always be ruled out. 
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5.3 Experience-Induced Changes in the 
Social Brain
The example of orphanage-reared children 
is certainly extreme, but also highly provoca-
tive. A natural question is whether the feed-
back link from the social world to the social 
brain might also be demonstrated in less 
extreme cases. A look at some of the more 
sociological chapters in Schutt, Seidman, 
and Keshavan (2015) provides some insight.
Chapter 13, by Patrick Sharkey and 
Robert Sampson, reviews the evidence on 
negative effects of neighborhood violence 
on the cognitive skills of US schoolchildren. 
It is natural to speculate that neighbor-
hood violence is associated with exposure 
to chronic environmental stress, which is, 
e.g., known to lead to an elevated risk of 
mental-health problems. Given the rela-
tively high levels of everyday violence in the 
United States compared to other Western 
countries and the large variation across 
neighborhoods, this is a promising example 
for analyzing (negative) feedback links from 
the social environment to the social brain. 
Relying on the National Longitudinal Study 
of Adolescent Health, Harding (2009) 
found that the negative effects of living in 
a disadvantaged neighborhood on develop-
mental outcomes (e.g., high-school gradua-
tion or teenage pregnancy) were mediated 
by the level of violence in the neighbor-
hood. This is aligned with recent work by 
Patrick Sharkey and coauthors reviewed 
in the chapter, which analyzed variation in 
the timing of exposure to violent incidents 
among children within given communi-
ties. Children evaluated within a week of 
a homicide occurring close to their homes 
performed substantially worse in assess-
ments of cognitive skills and were less likely 
to pass standardized exams. This evidence 
is thought provoking, but the relation to 
actual alterations of the social brain remains 
speculative since there is so far no direct, 
systematic neurological evidence on chil-
dren exposed to violence incidents.
Chapter 14, by sociologist Allan V. 
Horwitz, raises a caveat. In a mostly histor-
ical review, he argues that some intense but 
“normal” human reactions might temporar-
ily lead to symptoms typically associated with 
mental disorders, but not actually constitute 
disorders. An example is bereavement, i.e. 
sadness due to the death of a family member 
or friend. Although in some cases bereave-
ment might actually lead to pathological 
depression, for most people it is a tempo-
rary condition. The point of the chapter is 
that the “normal” social brain is prepared to 
deal with intense negative experiences with-
out necessarily experiencing long-run effects 
or, by extension, structural changes. This is 
a reasonable warning for further develop-
ments in this area but, as before, actual neu-
rological studies are scarce. In stark contrast 
to this position, in chapter 9, psychologist Jill 
M. Hooley warns that even a mild aversive 
stimulus such as personal criticism is associ-
ated with increased relapse risk for patients 
with depression or schizophrenia. Of course, 
both positions are compatible, pointing just 
to the difference between a “normal” brain 
and those of individuals vulnerable to psy-
chopathological disorders.
On a more positive note, the psychiatry- 
oriented chapter 15, by Shaun Eack and 
Matcheri Keshavan, focuses on the possi-
bility of using neuroplasticity to improve 
cognitive and social-cognitive functions in 
patients with schizophrenia. Previous uses 
of neuroplasticity have already produced 
promising therapies for other patients. For 
instance, stroke patients with impaired 
motor functions can benefit from repeated 
forced movements of affected limbs, and 
patients with dyslexia show improvements in 
language skills following repeated auditory 
treatment. Eack and Keshavan report on a 
specific eighteen-month treatment known as 
“cognitive enhancement therapy” (Hogarty 
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et al. 2004), in which schizophrenic patients 
receive cognitive training (computer-based 
exercises to enhance attention, memory, and 
problem solving) and social-cognitive group 
therapy addressing such key elements of 
social cognition as, e.g., emotional process-
ing, perspective taking, or the reading of 
nonverbal cues. The results of randomized 
controlled trials indicate improvement in 
social and nonsocial cognition. Part of the 
patients completed MRI procedures, and for 
those it could be observed that gray-matter 
volume in medial–temporal areas associated 
with social cognition was maintained, while 
in the case of controls it exhibited a reduc-
tion that is typical for schizophrenia patients. 
These results illustrate that a supportive, 
carefully structured social environment can, 
to a certain extent, repair the neurologi-
cal problems related to social cognition in 
schizophrenic patients.
6. Discussion: Where is Economics?
6.1 What Social Neuroscience Can Learn 
from Economics
The study of the social mind naturally 
attracts psychiatrists and sociologists—the 
former due to the importance of certain 
brain disorders for social neuroscience, and 
the latter for their focus on the social envi-
ronment. The cross-disciplinarity exem-
plified by Schutt, Seidman, and Keshavan 
(2015) is a welcome development, but its 
focus is markedly different from the one 
envisioned by Cacioppo and Berntson (1992) 
and Cacioppo, Visser, and Pickett (2006). 
The latter naturally placed social neurosci-
ence in a habitat that has given rise to nat-
ural developments such as neuroeconomics 
or the tighter integration of psychology and 
behavioral economics. The former seems to 
seek a new, self-contained identity in which 
economics (or even, say, social and cognitive 
psychology) play little or no role.
This is regrettable, for economics has 
much to offer to social neuroscience, on 
several fronts. First, as mentioned above, 
there is a remarkable parallel between the 
study of interpersonal decision making, that 
is, game theory, and the development of 
theory of mind, one of the main pillars of 
social neuroscience. Social neuroscience is 
to decision neuroscience as game theory is to 
decision theory. It is no coincidence that the 
regions of interest in neuroeconomic studies 
employing game-theoretic paradigms and 
studies of theory of mind are pointing to the 
same network, for the very starting point of 
both is simply “thinking about thinking.” As 
commented above, theory-of-mind studies 
have suffered from the lack of a standardized 
tasks (Spunt and Adolphs 2014; Schurz et al. 
2014), to the point that the exact nature and 
components of the underlying neural net-
work remain unclear. One of the strengths 
of behavioral game theory is precisely 
the discipline in paradigm development. 
Formulating a paradigm as a well-defined 
game allows one to extract its essence and 
naturally disciplines research. Further, once 
the essence is extracted, it is a simple matter 
to take the next natural step. For instance, 
while social neuroscience is still “thinking 
about thinking,” standard game-theoretic 
paradigms already capture “thinking about 
thinking about thinking about. . .” and so 
on. Researchers of the theory of mind 
might find it useful to turn their attention to 
 well-established paradigms as the prisoner’s 
dilemma, the beauty-contest game, or even 
coordination games.
Second, many of the ideas being informally 
discussed in social neuroscience can be given 
a formal-analytical foundation that would 
help disentangle speculation from deduc-
tion. Indeed, although social neuroscientists 
seem to be mostly unaware of them, such 
models already exist. Consider, for instance, 
the evolution of the brain. Social neurosci-
ence attempts to understand the  appearance 
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of intelligence and the social brain in 
terms of evolution, depicted as a series of 
responses to exogenously given changes in 
the environment. However, evolution has its 
own dynamics, which is not always easy to 
pin down in the absence of a formal model. 
For instance, Robson and Kaplan (2003) 
explained the evolution of intelligence 
in hunter–gatherer societies as a purely 
economic phenomenon. Young humans 
consume much more than they produce, cre-
ating a debt that has to be repaid in a later 
life phase with enhanced food production. 
This “life-cycle strategy” involves significant 
learning, which is made more economically 
efficient by increased intelligence. Robson 
and Kaplan (2003) consider growth models 
in which the brain is treated as somatic capi-
tal, with evolution selecting for the size lead-
ing to the steady-state growth rate. Simple 
comparative statics then explains how the 
expansion of the African Savannah resulted 
in increased brain productivity and led to 
increases in both intelligence and life expec-
tancy. Further, evolutionary arguments also 
help explain the coevolution of intelligence 
and theory of mind. As argued by Robson 
(2002), strategic intelligence could be caught 
in a “red-queen race” where being able to 
predict the actions and intentions of others 
confers an advantage, but since this is true 
for others as well, higher and higher levels 
of sophistication become necessary. At a dif-
ferent level, the axiomatic approach typical 
of microeconomics can be fruitfully applied 
to understand the difference between “as if” 
concepts such as “value” and the actual prop-
erties of decision making in the brain, both 
individual and interpersonal. For instance, 
Caplin and Dean (2008) provide an axiom-
atic foundation of “dopamine release func-
tions” capturing the link between dopamine 
and the reward prediction error as the basis 
for decision making.
Last but not least, economics can contrib-
ute to social neuroscience at the technical 
level. The analysis of brain data is becoming 
increasingly complex, as illustrated by the 
difficulties encountered by fMRI research-
ers. New techniques and the combination 
of existing ones (such as, e.g., recent studies 
integrating EEG and fMRI measurements) 
will require even more sophisticated analy-
ses and explicit statistical models. Structural 
models from econometrics might prove 
invaluable in this field. Further, it is obvious 
that network analysis will play an important 
part in the future of neuroscience (and social 
neuroscience is already making extensive 
use of it), and economists can hit the ground 
running in this particular race, as analyti-
cal models of networks have already been 
integrated into several subdisciplines within 
microeconomics.
6.2 What Economics Can Learn from Social 
Neuroscience
Even though a large part of economic 
behavior can be understood through deci-
sion theory, the ultimate objects of study 
of economics are markets, institutions, and 
groups. The study of reward valuations is 
an important milestone for (neuro)econom-
ics, but most economic decisions are made 
in interpersonal settings. Independently of 
whether social neuroscientists pay attention 
to economics or not, economists need to pay 
attention to social neuroscience. The sim-
plest definition of the social brain might be 
the set of brain functions underlying inter-
personal decisions and hence, the object of 
study of social neuroscience provides the 
foundation of economic decisions.
The conceptual links between both disci-
plines have hopefully been made clear in the 
previous sections. There are, however, more 
proximate payoffs to the study of social neu-
roscience. Recent trends in microeconomics 
and behavioral economics have focused on 
individual differences, ranging from gender 
to cognitive sophistication and personality 
traits, as a way to improve our understanding 
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of economic decisions and especially devia-
tions from normative rationality. At the very 
least, social neuroscience can be an invalu-
able source of information on individual dif-
ferences on interpersonal economic decision 
making, and such insights can be of interest 
even for economists not interested in the 
neural foundations of behavior (recall, for 
instance, the link between trait neuroticism, 
easily measured through the Big-Five ques-
tionnaire, and amygdala function mentioned 
in section 4.4).
It should be kept in mind that devel-
opments in neuroscience are providing a 
refreshing foundation for classical economic 
concepts such as utility. It would be naïve 
to expect, though, that the full neoclassical 
apparatus will be ultimately justified. Rather, 
evidence from neuroscience will be the 
ultimate judge as to the direction in which 
basic economic models should be developed, 
changed, and adapted to increase their real-
ism. For instance, a key question at this point 
is whether the same value can be postulated 
for social and nonsocial decisions. While one 
can assume either a single, unified value or 
two orthogonal ones and develop economic 
theories accordingly, the answer should 
come from the data, but choice data alone 
cannot settle this particular question.
In spite of popular beliefs, economics has 
already moved past the neoclassical dream 
of all-knowing, optimizing, self-interested 
agents. Several decades have passed since 
the first microeconomic models incorporat-
ing bounded rationality found their way into 
the mainstream. Psychology played a funda-
mental role in identifying heuristics, biases, 
and behavioral rules of interest. Later, behav-
ioral economics challenged the self-interest 
assumption, and started opening the black 
box of human motivation, often while essen-
tially keeping the parsimonious assumption 
of preference-maximizing agents. Insights 
from social neuroscience can be invaluable 
for the next steps as economics advances 
towards fully descriptive models of human 
behavior, incorporating bounded rationality, 
departures from self-interest, and strategic 
behavior. After all, if economics is a social 
science, then its object of study is, directly or 
indirectly, the social brain.
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